The Legal Production of the Transgressive Family: Binational Family Relationships between Cuba and the United States by Weissman, Deborah M.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 88
Number 5 Globalization, Families, and the State Article 15
6-1-2010
The Legal Production of the Transgressive Family:
Binational Family Relationships between Cuba and
the United States
Deborah M. Weissman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah M. Weissman, The Legal Production of the Transgressive Family: Binational Family Relationships between Cuba and the United
States, 88 N.C. L. Rev. 1881 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol88/iss5/15
THE LEGAL PRODUCTION OF THE
TRANSGRESSIVE FAMILY: BINATIONAL
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CUBA
AND THE UNITED STATES*
DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN**
This Article reviews the relationship between U.S. policy after the
1959 Cuban Revolution and the legal mechanisms that have
influenced the character of the binational Cuban-American family
since then. Over the course of the last fifty years, the United States
has used the rule of law to deny families fundamental customs of
care-taking and comfort. Of course, the immigration regulations
and attendant matters of travel and remittances are customarily
linked to national policy and international concerns. However, in
the case of U.S. laws governing the relationship of Cuban binational
families, there is no normativity of impartiality that can be
discerned, a condition that continues notwithstanding some recent
changes announced by the Obama administration. These efforts
have failed to achieve their goals. Cuban-American families have
improvised-often extralegal-mechanisms of familial support. In
doing so, they act as transgressors of laws and policies as a means to
maintain family support systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Geographical proximity has long facilitated travel between Cuba
and the United States. Throughout the nineteenth century and well
into the twentieth and twenty-first, Cubans have traveled north in
search of political sanctuary and economic opportunity.' Immigration
to the United States has developed fully into a salient constant of the
Cuban condition, one that has contributed to the emergence of a
unique binational family system. Cuban migration has itself been a
cause and consequence of U.S. policy. That Cuba was deemed vital to
U.S. strategic interests meant that American foreign policy has often
had as much an impact on migration patterns as Cuban domestic
policy, with far-reaching consequences: some intended, others
unintended.
The Cuban revolution of 1959 and the punitive U.S. response
have provided the context for a vast continuing Cuban migration.2 By
the end of the twentieth century, more than one million Cubans-
one-tenth of the total population-had emigrated,3 mostly to the
1. Gerald E. Poyo, Cuban Communities in the United States: Toward an Overview of
the 19th Century Experience, in CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES 44, 44 (Miren Uriarte-
Gast6n & Jorge Cafias Martinez eds., 1984) (describing nineteenth-century Cuban
migration as a result of Cuban separatist activity and the cigar industry in the United
States).
2. See infra Part II.
3. Throughout this Article, the use of the terms "emigration" and "gmigr"
correspond to the concept of the movement of people away from their homes to live in
different places, the terms "immigration" and "immigrant" correspond to the concept of
the movement of people to a place to settle there, and "migration" refers to the movement
of people from one place to another. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 602,
903, 1143 (3d ed. 1992).
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United States.4 United States policy, relying principally on economic
sanctions as the method to remove the Cuban government, has
resulted in unrelieved hardship on the Cuban people, and in the
process has profoundly transformed the nature of untold numbers of
Cuban families.
Migration developed within two phases of specific global
contexts, corresponding to Cuba's changing international position and
U.S. policy: the period after 1960, when Cuba aligned itself with the
Soviet bloc in the final decades of the Cold War; and the years after
1990, when Cuba adapted to the global economy in the post-Cold
War environment ("Special Period").5 In both instances, the
vicissitudes of U.S. policies that purposefully politicized migration as
part of the larger strategy of economic sanctions adversely affected
Cuban families. Divided families have found themselves continually
separated not only by the Florida Straits but also by U.S. laws and
policies that have manipulated migration procedures, restricted travel
authorization, and tightened remittance regulations, the very means
by which families maintain connections.6
This Article examines the relationship between U.S. policy after
1960 and the legal mechanisms that have influenced the character of
the binational Cuban-American family. The United States has used
the rule of law to deny families the capacity to fulfill the fundamental
custom of caretaking and comfort for the purpose of subverting the
Cuban revolution. Of course, the regulation of migration and
attendant matters of travel and remittances are customarily linked to
national policy and international concerns. However, in the case of
U.S. laws governing the relationship of Cuban-American binational
families, a normativity of impartiality cannot be discerned.
Part I considers the amendments to travel and remittance
restrictions imposed in June 2004 by the administration of George W.
Bush. These regulatory changes were certainly not the first to impose
significant limitations on the ability of families to maintain
connections across the Florida Straits, but they were the harshest to
date. Part II demonstrates the ways in which the 2004 restrictions
served as a new means to an old end. It reviews prior policy and legal
4. Lisandro Prez, Migration from Socialist Cuba: A Critical Analysis of the
Literature, in CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 12, 16.
5. Rafael Hern~ndez et al., Political Culture and Popular Participation in Cuba, 18
LATIN AM. PERSP. 38, 43 (1991). Cuba declared a "Special Period in Time of Peace" in
1990 in response to the economic collapse prompted by the demise of the Soviet Union, its
key trading partner and provider of subsidies. Id.
6. See infra Part II.
18832010]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and covert strategies, which imposed sanctions, utilized fear
mongering, or otherwise targeted families in the hopes that adversity
and hardships would foster political discontent within Cuba and
produce internal rebellion against the Cuban government. Part III
argues that during the post-Cold War period after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the socialist bloc when Cuba lost its trading
partners, the United States renewed its efforts to politically and
economically isolate Cuba to ensure that Cuba would fail in its efforts
to reintegrate itself into the global political economy. During this
period, after the United States recognized that binational family
relations transacted through visits and financial support for families in
Cuba had created a flow of foreign exchange and goods that had
allowed many Cubans to survive the very sanctions designed to topple
the Cuban government, U.S. policy began to increase its focus on
restricting travel remittances.7 Part III suggests that U.S. efforts to
dislodge the Cuban government by way of inflicting hardship on
Cuban families have failed. Cuban Americans improvised-often
extralegal-mechanisms of mutual familial assistance. In doing so,
they often have been obliged to act as transgressors of laws and
policies as a means to maintain family support systems.
United States-Cuba policies are presently under review and
revision in Washington.8 There is reason to hope for an end to the use
of U.S. laws that create hardships for Cuban binational families in
order to encourage the overthrow of the Cuban government.
President Obama recently announced the liberalization of family
travel and remittance laws.9 However, the administration's rhetoric
has not shifted, and the all-too-familiar pronouncements of what is
best for Cuba-as determined by the United States-persist. A bold
transformation from Cold War rhetoric and hostilities to full
engagement between the United States and Cuba is required to end
the United States' practice of using laws that create hardship for
Cuban binational families in attempts to overthrow the Cuban
government; such a transformation will allow full restoration of
binational relationships and reconciliation on both sides of the
Florida Straits.
7. See infra Part Il1.
8. Mary Beth Sheridan, Sides Gear Up for Fight over U.S. Ban on Travel to Cuba,
WASH. POST, Nov. 19,2009, at A8.
9. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Amends
Cuban Assets Control Regulations to Implement the President's Initiative on Family




I. 2004 FAMILY RESTRICTIONS: NEW MEANS TO OLD ENDS
In June 2004, the administration of George W. Bush announced
new regulations restricting the rights of Cuban Americans to visit and
support their families in Cuba.1" Travelers previously allowed to visit
relatives on the island once a year for up to ninety days, and perhaps
more in the event of a family crisis, were limited to one trip every
three years for a maximum of fourteen days"-no exceptions: not for
an emergency visit to be with a dying parent, nor to attend a family
funeral. 2 When questioned about the hardship imposed on families,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fisk responded, "So if they
have a dying relative, they have to figure out when they want to
travel."'3
The new regulations further redefined what constituted "family"
and prohibited visits to anyone other than spouses, children, parents,
grandparents, siblings, and grandchildren.14 Aunts, uncles, cousins as
well as individuals who, for example, may have previously functioned
as parents or caretakers, were henceforth denied family status for
purposes of visits. a5 Those without living relatives on the island were
thus barred from returning to their homeland. The new regulations
also limited the right of Cuban Americans to provide financial aid to
families in Cuba.16 A cap was set at $300 quarterly. 7 The maximum
amount travelers were authorized to carry with them during their
visits was reduced from $3,000 to $300.18 In addition, families were
prohibited from sending clothes and personal items. 9 Medicines and
other critical necessities could not exceed $200 in value.20
10. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,771, 33,771 (June 16, 2004)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.561(a) (2009)).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 150 CONG. REC. H7284 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2004) (statement of Rep. Delahunt),
available at http:/lfdsys.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2004-09-21/pdf/CREC-2004-09-21.pdf
(quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fisk).
14. 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,772 (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.561(c) (2009)). The
regulations also reversed prior regulations that authorized those who share a common
dwelling as a family with the traveler to accompany the traveler, unless they are also
immediate family members of the person to be visited. Id.
15. Id.
16. 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,773 (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a)(1) (2009)).
17. Id.
18. 69 Fed. Reg. at 33,773 (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(c)(4)(i)
(2009)).
19. 69 Fed. Reg. at 34,565 (codified as amended at 15 C.F.R. § 740.12(a)(2)(B)(1)
(2009)).
20. Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAMILIES TORN APART: THE HIGH COST
OF U.S. AND CUBAN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS 44, 53, 58 (2005) [hereinafter HUMAN
2010] 1885
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Notwithstanding the crisis suffered by Cubans after the devastating
hurricanes of 2005, the new regulations forbade Cuban Americans
from providing humanitarian assistance to their families and
communities on the island.2' Assistant Secretary of State, Roger
Noriega, conveyed the mean-spirited purport of the new regulations:
"[W]hat are we supposed to say to them? We're going to
continue to allow this money to be shoveled into the coffers of a
regime that's going to keep them in chains in-in-in under a
dictatorship because we want to preserve the right of people to
visit their aunts? 22
Of course, as Human Rights Watch noted in its report on Cuban
families affected by the restrictions, visiting aunts is not a trivial
matter, especially for those whose aunts and uncles raised them.23
That the 2004 travel and remittance regulations played havoc
with the circumstances of Cuban and Cuban-American families was
not a new phenomenon. For the past fifty years, family migration and
corollary issues of travel and remittances have been politicized by the
U.S. government as part of a larger U.S. strategy to effect "regime
change" in Havana.24 The Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union and
the expansion of Cuban influence in Africa and Latin America were
vital U.S. Cold War concerns. Certainly, this is the conventional
wisdom. But U.S. hostility continued unabated into the post-Cold
War period, suggesting that the sources of American attitudes toward
Cuba were not based entirely on matters of strategic considerations.25
Since the early 1990s, U.S. policy has been designed to thwart Cuban
RIGHTS WATCH], available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/10/18/families-torn-
apart (describing in vivid detail the effects of the travel and remittance restrictions on
Cubans in Cuba and in the United States).
21. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. E1571 (2005) (statement of Rep. Rangel) (highlighting
restrictions on remittances, gift parcels, and family travel to Cuba in the wake of
Hurricane Dennis, and arguing for the temporary suspension of those restrictions).
22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 58 (quoting then Assistant Secretary
of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega).
23. Id.; see JEANNE PARR LEMKAU & DAVID L. STRUG, LOVE, LOSS AND LONGING:
THE IMPACT OF U.S. TRAVEL POLICY ON CUBAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES 10-11 (2007)
(recounting the poignant story of a Cuban American who was unable to visit an uncle
dying of cancer: "How could I tell my uncle that he.. . wasn't family?").
24. See LEMKAU & STRUG, supra note 23, at 1, 3.
25. See Press Release, Sec'y John Snow, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba Releases Initial Report: Snow Commends President Bush's
Vision for Hastening the Day Cuba Is Free and Democratic (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1528.htm (identifying new and drastic means by
which the United States intensified its efforts to bring down the Cuban government).
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efforts to reintegrate into the global economy.26 United States
officials were convinced of Cuban vulnerability in the aftermath of
the collapse of the Soviet Union and sought to cut off Cuban access to
support of any kind in their continued efforts to precipitate the
collapse of the Cuban government.
Notwithstanding the long and antagonistic history of regulatory
maneuvers related to Cuban migration, travel, and remittances, the
2004 regulations were the harshest and most contentious to date.28
The announcements of the new restrictions were timed with the
release of a comprehensive cabinet-level report, entitled Commission
for Assistance to a Free Cuba.29 Charged with the formulation of
policies to topple the Cuban government, the Commission provided a
comprehensive program to hasten Cuba's "transition," including
specific recommendations on matters affecting Cuban and Cuban-
American families.3" According to the Commission, families who
continued to travel and send funds for household support were
barriers to the establishment of a "free Cuba."'" The report offered
instructions for supporting dissident groups, rebuilding the Cuban
infrastructure, developing new school curriculum, and procedures for
achieving a top-to-bottom overhaul of the Cuban Government,
including the drafting of a new constitution and converting the Cuban
economy to a free-market system.32 As one political scientist noted,
the report "read like some antiquated colonial blueprint" and as "a
symbol of the Bush administration's arrogant unilateralism and
26. See Sarah A. Blue, State Policy, Economic Crisis, Gender, and Family Ties:
Determinants of Family Remittances to Cuba, 80 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 63, 69-70 (2004)
(describing ongoing changes in remittance policies to deny Cuba access to capital).
27. Maria Cristina Garcia, Hardliners v. "Dialogueros": Cuban Exile Political Groups
and United States-Cuba Policy, 17 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3, 21 (1998) (describing support
for federal legislation that would isolate Cuba and bring it to collapse).
28. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 38 (noting that unlike past
restrictions, the 2004 regulations did not allow for any exceptions).
29. See generally COMM'N FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (2004) [hereinafter COMM'N FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, 2004
REPORT], available at http://2005-2009.cafc.gov/rpt/2004/c18166.htm (discussing regulatory
changes related to U.S.-Cuba relations). The Commission released a second report in 2006
with more of the same proposals; however, no regulatory changes were made following its
distribution. See generally COMM'N FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (2006), available at http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf
(outlining many of the same proposals as the 2004 report).
30. COMM'N FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, 2004 REPORT, supra note 29, at 7-
54.
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id. at 155, 201-51. The proposed overhaul called for U.S. "assistance" in drafting a
new constitution based on the view that "initially, Cubans may not be ideally positioned to
govern themselves." Id. at 175.
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penchant for intervention."33  The Secretary General of the
Organization of American States, Jos6 Miguel Insulza, was equally
blunt in responding to the administration's report: " 'There is no
transition, and it's not your country.' ,34
With these new restrictions, President Bush, who had made
"family values" the centerpiece of his 2000 presidential campaign and
a central part of his speeches in Latin America with the oft-repeated
quote that "[f]amily values do not stop at the Rio Bravo,"35 made
clear that commitments to family did stop at the shores of the Florida
Straits.36 The President often remarked on the importance of family
integrity and expressed an understanding for families who migrated
to provide for their loved ones.37 He approved of remittances to
enable migrants to "feed their families just like the citizens of
America can find work to feed their families."38 The new regulations
made clear, however, that Cubans and Cuban Americans were an
exception, and they were expected to suffer differently than their
33. William M. LeoGrande, Engaging Cuba: A Roadmap, WORLD POL'Y INST., Dec.
2008, at 87, 94; see also Alberto R. Coil, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting
Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199, 227
(2007) (describing the Commission report as "interventionist").
34. LeoGrande, supra note 33, at 94 (quoting Secretary General of the Organization
of American States Jos6 Miguel Insulza).
35. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Toledo in Toledo (Sept.
6, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64618.
36. See George W. Bush, Proclamation 7848-National Family Week, 2004 (Nov. 23,
2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62132 ("During National
Family Week, we underscore our commitment to supporting families and recognize the
significance of family to our country."); see, e.g., George W. Bush, Interview with Latin
American and American Spanish Language Journalists (Mar. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62632; George W. Bush, Remarks at Townhall
Meeting, Ontario, California (Jan. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62589; George W. Bush, Remarks at a
Welcoming Ceremony in Temozon Sur, Mexico (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24583; George W. Bush, Remarks to the
American Embassy Community in Quebec City (Apr. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45640; George W. Bush, The President's News
Conference with President Francisco Flores Perez of El Salvador in San Salvador, El
Salvador (Mar. 24, 2002), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73272
\fs24softline; George W. Bush, The President's News Conference with President Oscar
Berger Perdomo of Guatemala in Guatemala City (Mar. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24582; George W. Bush, The President's Radio
Address (May 5, 2001), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45586.
37. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Interview with Latin American and American Spanish
Language Journalists, supra note 36.
38. George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Toledo, supra note 35 (reminding
the audience of parents' desires to support their children in pushing migration-related
issues).
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counterparts in other Latin American countries and elsewhere
throughout the world.
II. SANCTIONS, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSION: MIGRATION AND
THE COLD WAR
The 2004 restrictions in many ways signified the culmination of
nearly fifty years of policy designed to visit hardship on families as a
way to topple the Cuban government.39 Since the early 1960s,
successive U.S. governments have adopted a policy of political
isolation and economic sanctions as a cost-effective way to undermine
the government of Cuba.40 The vicissitudes of migration over the
course of fifty years were consequences of a policy that itself often
lacked both clarity of purpose and consistency of implementation,
that sometimes was in contradiction with itself, but always caused
untold hardships for families who were denied customary means of
contact and mutual support with those who remained on the island.
A. Creating the Economic Context for Migration
The United States' approaches to migration occurred within the
larger context of sanctions imposed against Cuba through both legal
and irregular means. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy authorized a
trade embargo premised on existing statutory powers within the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trading with the Enemy Act
of 1917.41 The Treasury Department subsequently promulgated the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR") to prohibit financial
transactions and trade with Cuba.42 The U.S. government also
39. See LARS SCHOULTZ, THAT INFERNAL LITTLE CUBAN REPUBLIC: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 143, 175, 192-200 (2009). In response to the
nationalization of U.S. property, the Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union, and Cuban
support for armed struggle in Latin America, the United States adopted a series of actions
designed to overthrow the Cuban government, first through the ill-fated Bay of Pigs
(Playa Gir6n) in 1961, and later through a program of covert operations. Id.
40. See infra notes 41-48, 135-46 and accompanying text.
41. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620(a), 75 Stat. 424, 444-45
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (2006)); Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40
Stat. 411, 415 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2006)). For a list of other statutory and
regulatory sections that serve to prohibit trade and economic exchange with Cuba, see
generally DIANNE E. RENNACK & MARK P. SULLIVAN, U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS: AN
ANALYTIC COMPENDIUM OF U.S. POLICIES, LAWS & REGULATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library[Publications[Detail/?ots591=CAB359A3-9328-
19CC-A1D2-8023E646B22C&lng=en&id=13542.
42. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 6974, 6975 (July 9, 1963)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2009)). The Cuban Assets Control Regulations
("CACR") also froze all Cuban government assets in the United States. Id.
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resorted to covert means that went beyond the boundaries of the
embargo statutes and regulations. The CIA's covert program known
as Operation Mongoose included objectives that were carried out
through clandestine means, including one designed to "[h]arass the
economy."43 The United States set in motion plans to sabotage export
agricultural commodities, industries, public utilities, and
transportation capabilities in order to "reduce available economic
supplies and services," and "cripple Cuban commerce vital to the
regime's domestic economic program.' ' I
The American determination to politicize hunger was a key facet
of U.S. efforts to bring down the Cuban government. President
Dwight Eisenhower encouraged "quarantin[ing] Cuba," stating that
"if [the Cuban people] are hungry, they will throw Castro out. 45
Eisenhower explained that U.S. policy had as a "primary objective...
to establish conditions which will bring home to the Cuban people the
cost of Castro's policies and of his Soviet orientation. "46 Similarly,
President Kennedy used economic sanctions as a means to hasten
Fidel Castro's departure as a result of the " 'rising discomfort among
hungry Cubans.' ,4 The State Department advocated that " 'every
possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the
economic life of Cuba [in order to] bring about hunger, desperation
and [the] overthrow of the government.' "48
43. Memorandum from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to
the Special Group (Augmented) (Aug. 31, 1962), in X FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, at 974, 974 (Louis J. Smith & David S. Patterson eds., 1996)
[hereinafter FRUS VOL X], available at http://history.state.govlhistoricaldocuments/
frusl961-63v10/d399.
44. Id. at 985, 988; see, e.g., id. at 928, 931, 984.
45. Memorandum of a Conference with the President (Jan. 25, 1960), in VI FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958-1960, at 763, 763-64 (John P. Glennon &
Ronald D. Landa eds., 1991) [hereinafter FRUS VOL VI].
46. Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister MacMillan, Doc. 551 (July
11, 1960), in FRUS VOL VI, supra note 45, at 1000, 1003; see also Memorandum from the
Assistant Sec'y of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Sec'y of State, Doc. 594
(Oct. 19, 1960), in FRUS VOL VI, supra note 45, at 1091, 1091-92 (noting that economic
pressure will contribute to "dissatisfaction and unrest").
47. NOAM CHOMSKY, FAILED STATES: THE ABUSE OF POWER AND THE ASSAULT
ON DEMOCRACY 113 (2006) (quoting President Kennedy).
48. Louis A. Nrez, Jr., Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of U.S. Policy
Toward Cuba, 34 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 227, 242 (2002) (quoting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Lester D. Mallory); see also Memorandum from the Assistant Sec'y of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Sec'y of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson), Doc. 432 (Sept. 19, 1962), in FRUS VOL X, supra note 43, at 1068,
1068-69 [hereinafter Doc. 432] (predicting the peak of Cuban dissatisfaction with the
Castro regime as a result of the weakened economy).
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The logic of political isolation and economic sanctions was based
on an effort to create adversity and hardship within Cuba to foster
political disaffection and popular discontent, and thus create optimal
conditions to produce internal rebellion. In fact, economic hardship
did not result in sustained political opposition at home, but instead
produced migration abroad.49 With the exception of the years from
1959 to 1965-when immigration consisted principally of Cubans
associated with the Batista regime, upper-middle-class Cubans who
were mostly white, and individuals who feared retribution because of
their actions as informers or because of their collaboration with the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion-Cuban migration has followed
discernable patterns that corresponded to U.S. policies.50
Between 1965 and 1980, migration consisted of Cubans who left
principally because of the economic hardship and desires to reunite
with family in the United States primarily in South Florida and New
Jersey.51 Scholars of this migration period described this cohort as
"self-imposed exiles, ' '52 and "migrants who resembled the traditional
immigrants who came to the United States in search of better
economic opportunities ' 53 as a result of changing, and for many,
49. See Louis A. PREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 319 (3d
ed. 2006) (noting that Cubans sought relief from economic pressures through migration).
50. See PATRICK SYMMES, THE BOYS FROM DOLORES: FIDEL CASTRO'S
SCHOOLMATES FROM REVOLUTION TO EXILE 207 (2007) (describing the initial flight of
Cubans as being the wealthy and people implicated in the previous government); see also
Guillermo Bernal, Cuban Families, in ETHNICITY AND FAMILY THERAPY (Monica
Goldrick et al. eds., 1982), reprinted in CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
135, 137 (explaining the different phases and classes of Cuban migration to the United
States); Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, Cuba's Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration, 19 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 4, 9 (1985) (stating that the first wave of Cuban departures consisted of
the elite and wealthy); Alejandro Portes, Naturalization and Voting Patterns of Cubans in
the United States, in CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 1, 7 (describing the
cause and scope of Cuban immigration to the United States).
51. Bernal, supra note 50, at 137. Throughout this period, many Cubans were allowed
to migrate through a number of negotiated migration processes. Id. From 1965-1973,
Cuba opened the Camarioca port to allow Cuban 6migr~s to arrive by boat to pick up their
relatives. Id. From 1965-1971, the United States and Cuba negotiated airlifts ("Freedom
Flights") from Havana to Miami to allow primarily family members but also those who
were seeking economic opportunities, to migrate. Id.
52. John Scanlan & Gilburt Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80: Impact on
Refugee Flow from Cuba, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 119 (1983)
(referring to the early emigrants from Cuba as "[s]elf-imposed political exiles").
53. Bernal, supra note 50, at 137; see also Robert L. Bach, Socialist Construction and
Cuban Emigration: Explorations into Mariel, 15:2 CUBAN STUD. 19, 25 (1985) (stating that
the economy in Cuba created social pressures which resulted in emigration); Blue, supra
note 26, at 67-68; Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 116, 118,125 (reviewing testimony
that described Cuban emigrgs after the first two years following the revolution as neither
poor nor political, but rather frustrated by the lack of easily accessible consumer goods).
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worsening political and economic conditions in Cuba. As the next
section will describe, the economic conditions from which Cubans
were escaping during these years were often exacerbated, if not
created, by U.S. policy.
B. Migration, Fear-Mongering, and the Propaganda of the Cold War
The U.S.-Cuba policy had a larger purpose. In the throes of the
Cold War, the United States sought to use Cuban migration to
demonstrate to Africa, Asia, and Latin America that socialist systems
could not adequately provide for their people.' The spectacle of tens
of thousands of Cubans in flight from their homeland made for good
propaganda. The United States also used migration to weaken the
Cuban government from within. Additionally, the United States
encouraged the exodus of professional and skilled workers from Cuba
to create a "brain drain"55 that would sap Cuba of those individuals
with knowledge and needed abilities while positioning the United
States as a symbol of the "gateway to freedom."56 By promoting
migration, the United States hoped to gain control of a cohort of
exiles and put them to use in carrying out covert operations, sabotage,
and sowing fear amongst Cubans in order to turn world opinion
against Cuba.
United States documents declassified in 1996 reveal the
importance of migration in service of efforts to bring down the Cuban
government.57 Plans were made to produce "Cuban refugees and
54. See 2 THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 207-08 (Devesh Kapur et al.
eds., 1997) (noting foreign policy decisions formulated to concerns that third world
countries would succumb to socialist influences); Pdrez, supra note 48, at 239 (describing
U.S. concerns about containing communism and maintaining influence in these areas).
55. Pdrez, supra note 48, at 249.
56. 107 CONG. REC. A6111 (Aug. 7, 1961) (statement of Rep. Hale Boggs) (quoting
William S. White, How to Put Squeeze on Castro-United States Considering Economic
Blockade, Permanent Resettlement of Refugees, WASH. EVENING STAR, Aug. 7, 1961,
which Rep. Boggs had entered into the record); see, e.g., Felix Masud-Piloto, Cuba:
Colonizers, Slaves, Exiles, and Refugees in Cuban History, in MIGRATION AND
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL VIEW 53, 58 (Maura I. Toro-Morn & Marixsa Alicea eds.,
2004) (describing the scope and impact of the Cuban Refugee Program); Memorandum
from the Chief of Operations, Doc. 399 (Aug. 31, 1962), in FRUS VOL X, supra note 43, at
976, 991 [hereinafter Doc. 3991 (encouraging the exodus of skilled labor).
57. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Dir. of the U.S. Info. Agency (Murrow) to Dir.
of Cent. Intelligence McCone, Doc. 240 (Dec. 10, 1962), in XI FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1961-63, CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND AFTERMATH 605,605 (David
S. Patterson et al. eds., 1996), available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frusl961-63vll/d240 (discussing the use of radio broadcasts and economic pressure as a
means to turn the Cubans against their government); Priority Operations Schedule for
Operation Mongoose, Doc. 338 (May 17, 1962), in FRUS VOL X, supra note 43, at 810,
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defectors as dramatic witnesses against the Castro-Communist
regime" in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere. 8 Other projects
sought to produce an exile force that the United States could control
for purposes of disseminating propaganda materials which would be
delivered to them by the CIA in order to "disaffect the Cuban
people."59 Once Cubans arrived in the United States, the CIA
planned to cultivate certain groups for the purpose of creating dissent
inside Cuba.' The State Department plotted to infiltrate Cuban
migrant groups who would in turn encourage and engage in acts of
sabotage, "creat[e] and nurtur[e]" political opposition, and
"encourage resistance elements inside Cuba."61
One of the most politicized efforts to encourage Cuban
migration known as the "Pedro Pan Operaci6n" ("Peter Pan
Operation"), targeted families with young children.62 In the fall of
1960, a CIA-sponsored radio station broadcasted reports alleging that
the Cuban government planned to remove children from their
parents for purposes of indoctrination and military training.63 With
812 [hereinafter Doc. 338] (noting the importance of controlling migration for the purpose
of influencing activities within Cuba).
58. Doc. 338, supra note 57, at 814. In this memorandum, the U.S. government
candidly admits that it is the "task" of the CIA to produce defectors. Id. The government
also admits its plans to "[e]ncourage and exploit the defection of Cuban diplomats," to
"expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba," and to "disaffect the Cuban
people." Doc. 399, supra note 56, at 978, 982. Additionally, the government planned to
engage in "psychological propaganda" against Cuba. Doc. 338, supra note 57, at 813-14.
The subversive nature of these plans was underscored by the very fact that the CIA was
tasked with producing the defectors. See id. at 814.
59. Doc. 399, supra note 56, at 982.
60. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
61. Doc. 432, supra note 48, at 1070; Doc. 338, supra note 57, at 814.
62. MARiA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES, THE LOST APPLE: OPERATION PEDRO PAN,
CUBAN CHILDREN IN THE U.S., AND THE PROMISE OF A BETTER FUTURE 23 (2003)
[hereinafter TORRES, THE LOST APPLE] (describing Operation Peter Pan as an
ideological struggle to control children in Cuba as a means to influence the U.S. battle
against Cuban communism).
63. See id. at 67-69, 89 nn.8-10 (recounting the participation of Esso Standard and
Shell Oil, the Catholic Welfare Bureau, and the State Department); see also SANFORD J.
UNGAR, FRESH BLOOD: THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS 201 (1998) (describing
actions by the State Department and various charities that assisted in getting children out
of Cuba). A number of corporations, including those whose interests had been
nationalized in Cuba, participated in the initiative along with the Catholic Church and the
U.S. State Department. See, e.g., Marfa de los Angeles Torres, Elidn and the Tale of Pedro
Pan, NATION, Mar. 27, 2000, at 21 [hereinafter Torres, Elian and the Tale of Pedro Pan]
(noting a highly irregular grant of power to the executive director of the Miami Catholic
Welfare Bureau, Father Bryan Walsh); Jean Abreu, iNo Te Dejes Quitar A Tu Hijo!
Operation Pedro Pan and the Cuban Children's Program 9 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished
Honors Thesis, Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/
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deliberate intent to alarm parents with false information, the radio
broadcasts announced that children would be removed according to
newly enacted laws and instructed parents to take their children to
churches to await further instructions.' Families were told that their
children would receive scholarships to study in the United States.6" As
a result, an estimated 14,000 Cuban children from mostly white and
middle class families were relocated to camps, foster homes,
orphanages, and other institutions throughout the United States.66
Children were separated from siblings and were often cut off from
families, who were denied permission to visit them.67 Many endured
abusive conditions. 68 One woman, who suffered from her interactions
with terrified children who repeatedly called for their mothers who
remained in Cuba, described the devastating effects of the
operation.69 From the perspective of the Cold War politics, however,
the operation was a success. As Maria de los Angeles Torres, a Pedro
Pan herself, writes: "[t]he image of helpless children fleeing the island
captured the imagination of anti-Communists throughout the world,"
adding that "[i]f the battle over the children's minds in the 1960s had
been a way to contest the country's political future, interpreting the
bitstream/10161/837/3/AbreuHonors_Thesis.pdf (noting the participation of Esso
Standard Oil and Pan American Airlines).
64. See TORRES, THE LOST APPLE, supra note 62, at 89, 91. The CIA coordinated its
efforts with Special Operations in the Department of Defense to disseminate propaganda
not only in Cuba, but throughout Latin America in hopes of creating political divisions
within the Western Hemisphere. Id. at 90-91.
65. See id. at 88, 158-59 (stating that many Cubans were promised scholarships to
study in the United States as a means to disguise Operation Pedro Pan from Cuban
officials). Many teenagers who were anticipating scholarship opportunities were
devastated to learn there were none and instead endured life in military barrack-type
conditions. Id. at 159, 170-71, 180-82.
66. Mariana Ortega, Exiled Space, In Between Space: Existential Spatiality in Ana
Mendieta's Siluetas Series, 7 PHIL. & GEOGRAPHY 25, 29 n.14 (2004); cf. Emron Esplin,
Cuban Types, Distorted Memory, and a Return to Cuba in Cristina Garcia's The Aguero
Sisters, 20 CONFLUENCIA 83, 86 n.3 (2005) (investigating the effects of Operation Pedro
Pan on Cuban youths in the United States and in Cuba). Some parents were further
motivated to choose this course based on the assumption that they would then have an
easier time migrating to rejoin their children. Torres, Elian and the Tale of Pedro Pan,
supra note 63, at 21 (stating that half the Cuban children arriving in America lived with
relatives and the other half were placed in the foster care system); see also Abreu, supra
note 63, at 7 (describing how false information from the CIA and Cuban parents' fear of
the Cold War resulted in thousands of Cuban parents desperately sending their children to
the United States without knowing where they would stay, who would care for them, or
how long the separation would be).
67. See, e.g., TORRES, THE LOST APPLE, supra note 62, at 157, 162.
68. See, e.g., id. at 170-71 (detailing poor living conditions, cruel working situations,
and allegations of sexual abuse).
69. See id. at 157 (reporting the woman as saying that "her heart could not take it").
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exodus became a way to control its history."7 Decades later,
narratives revealing "The Dark Side of Pedro Pan" would reveal the
role of the CIA in the operation.71 These narratives illustrate the
United States' active effort to encourage Cuban migration, an effort
that continued throughout the decade.
C. Open Door Policy: Migration and the Cuban Adjustment Act
Perhaps no measure set in such sharp relief the politics of
migration as the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966.72 The United States
received the increasing Cuban migration by adopting an open-door
policy best described as exceptional. Most of the 165,000 Cubans who
came to the United States up to 1966 entered without immigrant
visas, without prior security checks, and without proof of guaranteed
employment in the United States.73 To accommodate them, Congress
adopted the Cuban Refugee Act ("Cuban Adjustment Act").74 The
Cuban Adjustment Act allowed Cubans to apply for permanent
residency one year after arrival without having to leave the country to
apply-a privilege, as noted by Ruth Wasem, that has been afforded
to no other nationality.75 The Act waived permanent resident
application fees for Cuban refugees.76 In addition to the privileged
application of the immigration laws, federally funded centers and
70. Id. at 93, 228-29.
71. See UNGAR, supra note 63, at 201 ("[T]he Miami Herald and other publications
have begun only recently to write about 'the dark side of Pedro Pan,' raising questions
about the morality of having encouraged the separation of children from parents for
reasons dictated by U.S. foreign policy."). Other U.S. offenses targeted at children were
uncovered, including efforts to sabotage food distribution and taint milk delivered to
school with cement powder. Abreu, supra note 63, at 52 (describing the revelations of
Verne Lyon who had been recruited to work for the CIA in 1962).
72. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255n (2006)) ("The Act"). The Act was amended by the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 9, 90 Stat. 2703, 2707 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). The Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments exempted those who could obtain lawful permanent resident status under
the Act from numerical limits of the preference system. Id. The Act was also amended by
the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207, 94 Stat. 102,103 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). The Refugee Act reduced the length of the physical presence
requirement from two years to one year. Id.; see also RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 2
(2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40566.pdf (discussing the Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966 and subsequent amendments).
73. Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 118 (comparing the exceptional treatment
afforded Cubans as compared with the Hungarians also fleeing a communist regime).
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
75. See WASEM, supra note 72, at 2.
76. Permanent Resident Application Fees for Cuban Refugees Waived, 55 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 967, 967 (1966).
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services-such as housing, counseling, education, training, and work
opportunities-expanded in South Florida to assist specifically new
Cuban residents.77
Legislators defended the exceptional treatment of Cubans, who
were first paroled into the United States without visas and
subsequently allowed to adjust status in an unusually short period of
time, without regard to quotas, and with blanket fee waivers.78 Some
argued that there was no consulate post in Cuba to which the Cubans
could apply for visas, although the decision to close the embassy was
unilaterally made by the U.S. government.79 Others argued that the
normal residency adjustment process by which noncitizens without
immigrant visas were required to leave and apply at a consulate
outside of the United States would be "costly and inconvenient" for
Cubans.8 °
Several legislators made efforts to extend the Act to similarly
situated immigrants from other countries. Some legislators
unsuccessfully attempted to include exiles from the Dominican
Republic who were fleeing the political instability of the post-Trujillo
years.8 Others endeavored to add amendments that would grant
similar adjustment benefits to immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere in the United States and whose petitions for adjustment
were pending on December 1, 1965.82 These amendments were
rejected.83 Legislators argued, unsuccessfully, that the financial
burden of leaving the United States to apply for adjustment of status
77. See, e.g., 108 CONG. REc. 8380-81 (1962) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart regarding
the "Resettlement of Cuban Refugees," detailing the federally funded types of assistance
offered to Cubans); Bernal, supra note 50, at 137; Carlos Forment, Caribbean Geopolitics
and Foreign State-Sponsored Social Movements: The Case of Cuban Exile Militancy 1959-
1979, in CUBANS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 65, 71.
78. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
79. See Editorial Note, Doc. 2 (Jan. 3, 1961), in FRUS VOL X, supra note 43, at 2, 2,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/policy/docs/frusX/01_15.html. On January 3, 1961,
after receiving a request from the Cuban government to reduce the number of U.S.
personnel in the embassy, President Eisenhower determined to completely break off
diplomatic relations while simultaneously directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to intensify
efforts to invade Cuba. Id. (documenting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordered to
investigate ways to train Cuban refugees and expand the program to invade Cuba).
80. 112 CONG. REC. 25,468 (1966) (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javitz); see also 112
CONG. REC. 22,915 (1966) (statement of Rep. William F. Ryan quoting Under Secretary
George Ball) (describing the difficulty many Cubans have experienced in trying to apply
for visas outside the United States).
81. See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. 25,467 (1966) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
82. 112 CONG. REC. 22,920 (1966) (statement of Rep. Jacob H. Gilbert); see 112
CONG. REC. 22,915, 22,916 (1966) (statement of Rep. William F. Ryan).
83. 112 CONG. REC. 25,468 (Oct. 6, 1966).
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was equally onerous on many Latin Americans and sought to "[put]
the people of Latin America on an equal footing" with people of the
rest of the world.'
The legislative debates illuminated the degree to which the issue
of Cuban migration served Cold War politics. Representative Feighan
put it succinctly: "granting of permanent resident status would further
American policy objectives: by further demonstrating the desire of
the United States to play a full and sympathetic role as a country of
asylum to refugees from communism."85 Representative Claude
Pepper stated his support for the Act because Cubans showed
opposition to the communist regime.86 Similarly, Senator Philip Hart
concluded that "we could find no more effective spokesmen to
describe the destruction of freedom under Castro's brand of
communism. '"87 Precisely because Cubans could serve larger ends,
they were the "special favorites" in the realm of immigration laws and
policies.88 The Cuban Adjustment Act served its purpose and then
some. By the end of 1979, over 670,000 Cubans had migrated to the
United States.89 Because they were easily able to obtain permanent
residency, Cubans naturalized at a faster rate than other immigrant
groups and thus obtained political power more rapidly.90 But the Act
was not without consequences. Many families were traumatized by
the prospect of settling in the United States without contact with
family, and close relationships were disrupted.91 Parents were
separated from children, brothers from sisters, and many were never
to see grandparents, cousins, aunts, and uncles again. Additionally,
families were not immune to the political conflicts occasioned by the
nature of the Cuban revolution and the manipulation of the politics of
exile engendered to facilitate U.S. Cold War interests.
D. From Open Door to Open Arms: Migration and the Mariel
Boatlift
In addition to the Cuban Adjustment Act, there were other ways
in which Cubans migrated to the United States. The Mariel exodus,
84. 112 CONG. REC. 22,915, 22,916 (1966) (statement of Rep. William F. Ryan).
85. 112 CONG. REC. 22,914 (1966) (statement of Rep. Michael A. Feighan).
86. 112 CONG. REC. 22,918 (1966) (statement of Rep. Claude Pepper).
87. 110 CONG. REC. 2918 (1964) (statement of Sen. Philip Hart).
88. Joyce A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 39, 39-40 (1999).
89. FELIx ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, WITH OPEN ARMS: CUBAN MIGRATION TO
THE UNITED STATES 3 (1988).
90. Portes, supra note 50, at 2.
91. See Bemal, supra note 50, at 148-50 (giving examples of how families were
negatively affected by migration).
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which took place between April 1980 and October 1980, provides
additional evidence of the politicization of migration by way of the
continued efforts by the United States to manipulate conditions on
the island and the favored treatment of Cuban immigrants once they
reached U.S. soil.92 During this period, over 125,000 Cubans entered
the United States. 93 This large-scale migration occurred after a period
in the late 1970s in which some Cubans on the island were hijacking
boats, at times at gunpoint, in order to force boat captains to take
them to Florida where they were immediately paroled into the United
States.94 A series of dangerous attempts by Cubans to storm Latin
American embassies followed the hijackings. The most notable
incident occurred on April 1, 1980, when six Cubans seeking asylum
crashed their bus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in
Havana, killing a Cuban guard and setting off turmoil and violence on
the embassy grounds.95 Weary of the U.S. government's refusal to
treat the embassy incidents and hijackings as illegal acts of violence-
a policy that appeared to encourage such acts even though Cuba had
prosecuted U.S. hijackers who had flown U.S. planes to Cuba-the
Cuban government declared the Port of Mariel open, and invited
exiles to come by boat to transport their relatives to the United
States. 96
The Mariel exodus must be further understood in its specific
historical context. It followed a period of slow emigration and other
important but momentary changes in U.S. policy. During the years of
92. Silvia Pedraza, Cuba's Refugees: Manifold Migrations, in 5 CUBA IN TRANSITION
311, 318 (Ass'n for the Study of the Cuban Econ. ed., 1995), available at
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5/FILE26.PDF.
93. Id.
94. SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 354.
95. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 78-79; see RENNACK & SULLIVAN, supra note
41, at 285; SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 353-54; Lorena Barberia, Remittances to Cuba:
An Evaluation of Cuban and U.S. Government Policy Measures 8 (Rosemary Rogers
Working Paper Series, 2002), available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/
rrwp/15_remittances.pdf. The incident at the Peruvian embassy was not the first of its
kind. Previous attempts by Cubans to force their way into Latin American embassies
occurred as early as May 1979 and resulted in injuries to embassy employees and other
Cubans. See SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 353-54.
96. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 82-83 (describing the factors that led the
Cuban government to open the Port of Mariel); SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 354-56
(" 'The United States encourages illegal departures from Cuba, the hijacking of boats, and
it receives the hijackers almost as if they were heroes.' " (quoting Fidel Castro)). The
Immigration and Nationalization Service did the best that it could to prosecute boat
owners who traveled to Cuba to bring Cubans to Florida. There were a few unsuccessful
attempts, but the policy was to ignore these law breakers. Id. at 356; see, e.g., Pollgreen v.
Morris, 770 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289,
289-90 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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the Carter presidency (1977-1981), and for the first time since the
Cuban revolution, the United States had indicated a willingness to
discuss normalization of relations with Cuba without preconditions.97
Although the United States did not lift the embargo in 1977, the
Carter administration ended restrictions on travel to Cuba, permitted
limited remittances, and signed a number of bilateral agreements to
signal possibilities for reconciliation.98
In 1978, the Cuban government welcomed exiled families
previously barred from visiting Cuba. 9 At the invitation of the Cuban
government, exiles entered into a series of talks, known as "the
didlogo," for the purpose of determining how best to accomplish
family reunification."° Although many who entered into the dialogue
were threatened with violence, and in some instances suffered
extreme violence and even death by hard-line Cuban-American exiles
opposed to any form of reconciliation, for many, the desire to reunite
with families prevailed over fear and intimidation.1"' Cuban
Americans quickly took advantage of the new opening, and within a
year's period, over 100,000 families paid visits to their loved ones and
communities.10 2 Reunification efforts also led to the establishment of
organizations whose goals were to continue to advocate for the needs
of binational families. 03
With the influx of Cuban-American visitors and the dollars and
goods they introduced into the island, conditions for many families
improved.1" Relatives could not, however, sustain the Cuban
economy, and indeed, economic sanctions continued to take their
97. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 71.
98. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR THE 111TH
CONGRESS 2, 3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40193.pdf (noting that
President Carter amended the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") regulations
allowing travel from 1977 through 1982 when the restrictions were reimposed again);
MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 71.
99. MARfA CRISTINA GARCIA, HAVANA USA: CUBAN EXILES AND CUBAN
AMERICANS IN SOUTH FLORIDA, 1959-1994, at 47 (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 49-52 (noting that this was particularly true for families of political
prisoners, over four thousand of whom were released).
102. Bernal, supra note 50, at 152-53.
103. U.S. Policy and the Future of Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and U.S. Travel to
Cuba: J. Hearing Before the H. Subcomms. on Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment;
Western Hemisphere Affairs; and International Operations of the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 103d Cong. 56, 70 (1993) (statement of Alicia M. Torres, Ph.D., Executive
Director of the Cuban-American Committee Research & Education Fund) (describing the
creation of the Cuban-American Committee Research and Education Fund following the
didlogo).
104. GARCIA, supra note 99, at 52.
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toll.1 5 These were times of increasing tension in Cuba as a result of
exposure to U.S. consumer goods (the "blue jean revolution")." 6
Cubans were introduced to the proposition, if not myth, of "material
abundance" on the other side of the Florida Straits."° These factors,
together with additional encouragement from the United States, set
the stage for the Mariel phenomenon.1 8
Notwithstanding the changing forces that affected the Mariel
migration, there were important consistencies with regard to the
Marielitos1°9 in the realm of U.S. policy and its treatment of Cuban
migration. First, the U.S. government continued its strategy of
manipulation of events in Cuba that encouraged the mass exodus.
Following the tragic incident at the Peruvian embassy, the Carter
administration not only failed to condemn the violence, on the
contrary, it applauded it. In response to the Mariel exodus that
ensued, Vice President Walter Mondale, echoing earlier sentiments
on the propaganda value of Cuban migration, stated, "[t]here is no
better proof of the failure of Castro's revolution than the dramatic
exodus which is currently taking place."" l0  President Carter
responded to the crisis by granting refugee status to all those who
entered the Peruvian embassy and promising to "continue to 'provide
an open heart and open arms for the tens of thousands of refugees
seeking freedom from Communist domination'" and from economic
deprivation, brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his
government."'
105. Id. at 52-53.
106. See id. at 53-54 (describing cultural changes in Cuba as a result of increased
contact with Cuban 6migrds); Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 52, at 135 (describing the
impact of visits on Cubans who never left and who were impressed by the wealth and
lifestyles of the visitors from the United States); see, e.g., Bach, supra note 53, at 37; Blue,
supra note 26, at 69; Barberia, supra note 95, at 8-9.
107. See Prez, supra note 4, at 12, 14 (critiquing the U.S. manufactured "myth of
abundance" used to lure Cubans to the United States).
108. Id. at 12-14; Jorge Cafias Martinez, The Cuban Immigrant of 1980: An
Exploration of Psychosocial Issues in the Migration Experience, in CUBANS IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 181, 181-82.
109. The term Marielitos refers to those Cubans who arrived in the United States
during the period between April 1980 and October 1980. See PAUL ALLATSON, KEY
TERMS IN LATINO/A CULTURAL AND LITERARY STUDIES 155 (2007).
110. Cuban Refugees, White House Statement, 80 DEP'T ST. BULL. 68,68 (1980).
111. MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 83 (quoting President Jimmy Carter). Carter
was also facing re-election and was motivated by the concerns of the Cuban-American
community who, despite some level of disdain for the Marielitos, would not accept a
termination of the open-door immigration policy Cubans had enjoyed. Scanlan &
Loescher, supra note 52, at 136.
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Second, the United States granted Marielitos, like their
predecessors, exceptional legal status. At the time of the exodus, the
United States had passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which placed a
quota on "refugees" from Cuba.112 Cubans were no longer allowed
blanket entrance as refugees. They were to be treated in a similar
manner as any other arriving immigrants seeking asylum, that is, they
were subject to individual case review according to asylum standards
and procedures and subject to detention while awaiting
determinations in their case.113
Though the Refugee Act of 1980 was intended to reduce the
arbitrary and political nature of the executive's parole power, the
President continued to grant such relief to Cubans, who continued to
enter the United States notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.
government had spurned the idea that the great majority of Cuban
immigrants were eligible for asylum."4 Moreover, a subsequent
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act extended the
special privileges that encouraged migration from Cuba over all other
countries." 5 These entrants were not only allowed to adjust their
status to lawful permanent residents outside of regular legal processes
but were also granted access to other federal statutory relief entitling
them to social services and benefits not available to other
immigrants." 6 The Mariel exodus episode illuminated the dilemma
created by the United States' politicized migration policies and laws
that served U.S. Cold War politics.
112. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207, 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)); see Richard A. Boswell, Throwing Away the Key:
Limits on the Plenary Power, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689, 689 (1997) (reviewing FELIX
MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS: CUBAN
MIGRATION TO THE U.S., 1959-1995 (1996) and MARK S. HAMM, THE ABANDONED
ONES: THE IMPRISONMENT AND UPRISING OF THE MARIEL BOAT PEOPLE (1995)).
113. Hughes, supra note 88, at 56.
114. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 89, at 84, 86. The President was forced to grant
somewhat similar relief to a group of Haitians who had migrated because the discrepancy
in treatment between the two nationalities was too great to continue. Boswell, supra note
112, at 689 n.3. A separate status termed "Cuban-Haitian Status" was enacted by
executive order to deal with the admission of Cubans and Haitians during this period. Id.
115. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 202, 100 Stat.
3359, 3404 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)).
116. The exception here was a short-lived category of Haitian entrants. See WASEM,
supra note 72, at 5-6 (referencing the Immigration Reform and Control Act and Title V of
the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, § 501, 94 Stat. 1799,
1809); Boswell, supra note 112, at 697-98.
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E. Maintaining Pressure, United States-Cuba Policy, and the Cuban-
American National Foundation
As hostilities between Havana and Washington continued
unabated and ongoing efforts to use migration as a political means
failed to achieve U.S. purposes, the United States sought additional
ways to weaken Cuba. Once again, the government looked for ways
to control, if not exploit, the Cuban-American community and the
identity of exile for these purposes."7 In 1981, Cuban Americans in
Miami, encouraged and supported by the Reagan administration,
created the Cuban-American National Foundation ("CANF") to
function as a Cuban-American political action committee modeled
after the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the pro-Israel
lobbying group.' The group was conceived in the context of larger
global concerns, specifically regarding the Western Hemisphere and
what U.S. policy makers perceived as growing threats to U.S. political
and economic domination of the region." 9 The founding of CANF
was linked to President Reagan, Republican Party operatives, and
CIA veterans who came to appreciate the efficacy of a fiercely
conservative Cuban-American lobby to provide domestic impetus to
U.S. foreign policy and "popularize the Reagan administration's
policies." 2 °
CANF wielded significant influence in Congress through sizeable
campaign donations targeted particularly at Senate candidates with
influence in matters of foreign policy.'21 CANF members were
appointed by the Reagan administration to United Nations
committees as part of the government's efforts to globalize the U.S.
purpose of and means for isolating Cuba and fostering economic
117. See supra Parts II.A., II.B.
118. See SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 370; Damiin J. Ferndndez, From Little Havana
to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 115, 125 (Mohammed E. Ahrari ed., 1987); Introduction, History as
Prologue: Cuba Before the Special Period, in A CONTEMPORARY CUBA READER 1, 20
(Philip Brenner et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter CUBA READER].
119. MARIA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES, IN THE LAND OF MIRRORS: CUBAN EXILE
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 114-15 (1999) (describing the directions from Roger
Fontaine, a principal advisor to President Reagan on Latin America on the National
Security Council, to create such a lobby based on a report that cited concerns about Soviet
and Cuban influence in the region).
120. PATRICK J. HANEY & WALT VANDERBUSH, THE CUBAN EMBARGO: THE
DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 35-36 (2005); see Ferndndez,
supra note 118, at 124 (noting the Cuban-American National Foundation's ("CANE")
strategic lobbying and contributions to politicians with foreign policy influence).
121. See HANEY & VANDERBUSH, supra note 120, at 87.
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turmoil on the island.1 2 In turn, CANF received government
contracts, funding for projects related to migration, and support for
its propaganda efforts through control of Radio Marti.
123
CANF's main purpose was to gain political influence over the
Cuban-American community in service of U.S. policies. It opposed a
continuation of "the didlogo" and attacked Cuban Americans who
encouraged negotiations between the United States and Cuba.124
Although it was not the most extreme of the exile groups, its
privileged relationship to the Reagan administration gave it
legitimacy and resources with which to impose its views.125 Indeed,
Human Rights Watch condemned the climate of fear, intimidation,
and suppression of speech fostered by CANF.
126
CANF functioned as "a product of the North American
pathology ... an instrument-not an instigator-of policy."' 27 By
virtue of its ties to policy makers, CANF wielded power in an attempt
to shape exile politics. It succeeded in obtaining prohibitions and
restrictions on accords and agreements designed to facilitate family
contact, claiming that these relationships served to support Castro.1
28
It was with CANF support that in 1982, President Reagan reimposed
travel restrictions that the Carter administration had lifted. 129 Families
122. See SCHOULTZ, supra note 39, at 415 (describing the work of CANF in producing
a bill of particulars against Cuba and bringing it before the U.N. General Assembly);
TORRES, supra note 119, at 131 (noting the appointment of a CANF operative as U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission in order to exert pressure on
Cuba); see also HANEY & VANDERBUSH, supra note 120, at 39 (noting the relationship
between Otto Reich and CANF); Mia Taylor Valdes, Double Standard for Human Rights,
PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1992, at 20, 21, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN WORLD
AFFAIRS 192 (Donald Altschiller ed., 1993) (noting Otto Reich's position as co-chair of
U.S. Mission to the U.N. Human Rights Commission).
123. See, e.g., HANEY & VANDERBUSH, supra note 120, at 40-42; SCHOULTZ, supra
note 39, at 370, 414; TORRES, supra note 119, at 146; Fernandez, supra note 118, at 126.
124. See Sallie Dinkel, Exile's End, TOWN & COUNTRY, July 1993, at 83, 87.
125. See Carlos Forment, Caribbean Geopolitics and Foreign State-Sponsored Social
Movements: The Case of Cuban Exile Militancy 1959-1979, in CUBANS IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 1, at 65, 84 (arguing that Cuban-American political consciousness was
shaped primarily in the United States, not in Cuba).
126. See REESE ERLICH, DATELINE HAVANA: THE REAL STORY OF U.S. POLICY
AND THE FUTURE OF CUBA 46 (2009).
127. LOUIS A. PtREZ, JR., CUBA IN THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION: METAPHOR AND
THE IMPERIAL ETHOS 273 (2008).
128. TORRES, supra note 119, at 143. CANF would change its position on this over
time. See infra Part III.C.
129. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON
TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 3 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/83002.pdf
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were now burdened with the requirement of a special license to travel
to Cuba. 30
The Cuban-American community, while associated with the
politics of exile, has long lost its monolithic character, and its
members have demonstrated divergent views on Cuba and U.S.-Cuba
relations."' CANF set the stage for the post-Cold War struggle
between the political economy of globalization and the transcendent
desires of the binational Cuban-American family to maintain ties and
support.
III. SANCTIONS AND THE POST-COLD WAR GLOBAL ECONOMY,
1990-PRESENT
A. Torricelli, Helms-Burton, and the Migration Crisis of the 1990s
In the early 1990s, a dramatic global shift occurred. The collapse
of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc signaled Cuba's loss of
trading partners. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Cuba plunged
into a deep economic crisis that threatened the survival of the Castro
government. 3 2 Cuba responded by seeking to engage with other
countries and establish and improve international relationships-
including its relationship with the United States-in its efforts to seek
new economic ties and foreign investors.'33 The government also
introduced political reforms as well as domestic economic adaptations
as a means to weather the crisis and fend off internal collapse.3
130. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,060, 32,060 (July 23, 1982)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(b) (2009)).
131. See generally Sung-Chang Chun & Guillermo Grenier, Anti-Castro Political
Ideology Among Cuban Americans in the Miami Area: Cohort and Generational
Differences, LATINO RES. NOTRE DAME, Nov. 2004, at 1, available at
http://latinostudies.nd.edu/pubs/pubs.php?type=91&sterms=Castro&stype=0&Submit=Se
arch (explaining that while an anti-Castro ideology still pervades the Cuban-American
population, a shift in approach has allowed more mainstream elements of the community
to adopt a more conciliatory attitude).
132. See supra note 5 for a description of Cuba's "Special Period."
133. See Robert S. Gelbard, U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 312, 313
(1992); James Petras & Morris Morley, Clinton's Cuba Policy: Two Steps Backward, One
Step Forward, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 269, 280 (1996).
134. CUBA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1, 5 (Archibald R.M. Ritter & John M.
Kirk eds., 1995). The Cuban government legalized the use of dollars and granted Cubans
access to dollar-only stores. The government authorized farmers and artisans to establish
free markets, and liberalized self-employment opportunities. See SULLIVAN, supra note
98, at 13. In 1994, in response to U.S. prohibitions on foreign trade with Cuba in dollar




It was in this changing global setting that the United States
seized new opportunities to further increase pressure on Cuba by
enacting the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 ("Torricelli Act") 3' for
the stated purpose of "wreak[ing] havoc on the island."' 36 In response
to Cuban efforts to reintegrate itself into the global economy, the
Torricelli Act sought to assume extraterritorial authority and
prohibited third-country subsidiaries of U.S. companies from doing
business with Cuba.'3 7 It authorized the President to impose
sanctions, including cutting aid and debt relief on any country that
traded with or assisted Cuba.'38
During the next four years, Cuba continued to expand market-
style economic reforms, establish trade relationships with countries
outside of the former Soviet bloc, and open its markets to foreign
investors. 39 Although the Clinton administration acknowledged the
reforms, the administration nonetheless dismissed them as a sign of
weakness-proof that the embargo was working and that more of the
same would deliver the coup de grace to the struggling Cuban
government.14 ° Thus, in pursuit of never-ending hopes of accelerating
the Cuban government's demise, and in response to further
deteriorating relationships between the United States and Cuba,
Congress enacted yet another embargo-related statute, the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton
Act").' 4'
135. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (2006)).
136. ERLICH, supra note 126, at 106 (noting the statement made by the bill's author,
Rep. Robert Torricelli).
137. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 6003(a); see Gelbard, supra note 133, at 317
(noting concerns that the law demanded other countries similarly embargo Cuba).
138. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 6003(b)(1). Any vessel known to be engaging in
trade with Cuba was barred from loading or unloading freight at any place in the United
States. § 6005. The statute included U.S. territories and "possessions." § 6005(b)(4)(B).
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. See CUBA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 134, at 5 (noting that the
Clinton administration misread the developments in Cuba); Petras & Morley, supra note
133, at 275 (" 'Everything they've done recently are things we've been advocating. That's
good, but our question is what's next?' "(quoting a State Department official)).
141. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021,
6021-6091 (2006)). Among other provisions, the Act required the ouster of the Castro
brothers as a condition precedent to normalization of relations. § 6065 (a)(7). It also
included provisions known as "Track Two," which included "humanitarian aid" to Cuba
and support for "democracy-building efforts." §§ 6039, 6061. Despite its claims to improve
telephone communication and mail services, the Act accomplished neither because it
prohibited payment of revenues for services to Cuba. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992;
And Withdrawal of MFN Status from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 80-81 (1992)
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The Helms-Burton Act expanded restrictions, added new
sanctions, and codified all aspects of the embargo, thereby prohibiting
the executive branch from easing the restrictions without an act of
Congress.142 The new law expanded the extraterritorial reach of the
embargo and prohibited the importation of any products, including
goods "made or derived in whole or in part of any article which is the
growth, produce, or manufacture of Cuba."'4 3 Congress instructed the
executive branch to exercise its authority to prevent Cuba's
membership in international financial institutions and the
Organization of the Americas.'" International financial institutions
that engaged in financial transactions with Cuba would suffer a forfeit
of payment by the United States.145 As a result, the lack of access to
international financing severely limited Cuba's integration into the
global economy.146
After the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts, the embargo
operated at full throttle, despite admissions by the U.S. government
that the threat of communism in the region was nonexistent. 147 The
extraterritorial provisions were effective. Countries dependent on
U.S. aid and corporations engaged in U.S. trade, fearful of reprisals,
pulled out of Cuba.'48 The logic of U.S. policy remained constant: to
(statement of Alicia Torres, Ph.D., Executive Director of the Cuban-American
Committee Research & Education Fund); Phillip Brenner, Patrick J. Haney & Walter
Vanderbush, The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: U.S. Policy Toward
Cuba, 1998-2001, 3 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 192, 194 (2002) (describing a new migration crisis
and the actions by an extreme exile group known as "Brothers to the Rescue," which
dropped leaflets over Havana and violated Cuban airspace, provoking Cuba to shoot
down two of the planes in international waters).
142. Helms-Burton Act §§ 6021, 6032(h).
143. § 6040.
144. §§ 6034, 6035.
145. § 6034. In 2004, the United States fined UBS, Switzerland's largest bank, in the
amount of $100 million for trading with Cuba in dollars. See Marc Frank, Will Cuba Be
Allowed to Use Dollars Again? Cuba Dollar Tax Reveals Complexity of Trade Embargo,
ABCNEWS.COM, May 18, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/Story?id=7595000&
page=.
146. See Mauricio de Miranda Parrondo, The Cuban Economy: Amid Economic
Stagnation and Reversal of Reforms, in CUBA READER, supra note 118, at 128, 132-33
(describing such lack of access as a principal factor that prevents the Cuban economy from
adequate development); Will Weissert, Cuba Says US Should Lift Embargo
Unconditionally, ABCNEWS.COM, Sept. 16, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/
wireStory?id=8591409 (reporting figures provided by a Cuban official that U.S. trade
sanctions have cost Cuba $96 billion in economic damages).
147. See Petras & Morley, supra note 133, at 269, 271.
148. See The Implementation of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad) Act of 1996: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H.
Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. 61-65 (1996) (statement of the Cuban
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deepen economic hardship among Cubans who were now especially
vulnerable in the post-Soviet environment, and thereby generate
popular discontent inside Cuba and-the Americans hoped-
uprisings against the Cuban government. The embargo laws and
regulations were successful, particularly with regard to the impact on
Cuban families. Families suffered nutritional deficits and limited
access to medicines. 149 The prohibition on trade and travel made the
pain of family separation all the more difficult.15 °
Many Cuban-American families objected strenuously to these
laws. Alicia Torres, testifying before Congress on behalf of the
Cuban-American Committee Research and Education Fund, argued
that families should not be used as weapons in the U.S. war against
Cuba. 1 ' The "pressure cooker" theory, she noted, would have
repercussions principally on "our relatives in Cuba" who would suffer
"greater hardships." '152 Representatives of the Cuban Democratic
Party in Miami, the Coordinated Organizations of Human Rights in
Cuba, and Cuban dissident groups testified about the wrong-
headedness of the restrictions, including the travel restrictions, noting
that in Cuba, "ordinary citizens are consumed by the daily struggle
for survival."'53
The burden, of course, fell primarily on Cubans who lived on the
island. For example, a public health expert who visited Cuba
following the Torricelli Act noted the detrimental effect of the new
law on the health of Cuban citizens due to the U.S. domination of the
American National Foundation) (providing a list of banks, companies, and a wide range of
commercial interests that no longer did business in Cuba).
149. See INTER-AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 2 INTER-AMERICAN YEARBOOK
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1902 (1998) (excerpting from findings of the Inter-American Special
Rapportuer on the impact of the embargo on Cuban families).
150. See ROSEMARIE SKAINE, THE CUBAN FAMILY: CUSTOM AND CHANGE IN AN
ERA OF HARDSHIP 78-79 (2004).
151. See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992; And Withdrawal of MFN Status from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, supra note 141, at 79-86. Torres also noted that the provisions of the
Act that were hailed as benefits to Cuban families, such as improved telephone
communication, were of no use because the embargo prohibited improvement to the lines
and payment to Cuba for their share of telecommunications revenues. Id. at 80,85.
152. Id. at 87.
153. Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup Before
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 107, 110 (1992) (statement of Dr. Enrique
Baloyra, Professor of Political Science, Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Miami, and President, Coordinadora Social Dem6crata de Cuba); id. at 138
(testimony of Alfredo Duran, Representative of Cuban Dissidents); see id. at 138, 147
(testimony of Ramon Cernuda, Representative of Coordinated Organizations for Human
Rights in Cuba).
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pharmaceutical industry, the ban on subsidiary trade, and the newly
imposed licensing requirement for sending medicines and medical
supplies.M A report by the American Association of World Health
concluded that the embargo had resulted in a number of nutritional
deficiency related illnesses, including the highly publicized eye
disease (neuropathy) that has affected so many Cubans. 5' Indeed, a
Miami Herald poll in Cuba found that a majority of Cubans identified
the U.S. embargo and not the Cuban government as the cause of
economic turmoil and misery. 15 6
Predictably, the combination of the Soviet collapse, the ensuing
loss of Soviet subsidies, and the consequences of the Torricelli and
Helms-Burton Acts resulted in a marked increase in the number of
Cubans who made desperate attempts to leave the island. In 1994,
tens of thousands of Cubans left Cuba in unseaworthy boats and
homemade rafts precipitating what has come to be known as the
balsero ("rafters") crisis."' Like the Marielitos before them, the
balseros fit the prototype of economic refugees and garnered less
sympathy than earlier migrgs who were more readily classified as
political exiles." 8
The response of the United States to the balsero crisis indicated a
shift in U.S.-Cuba foreign policy. President Clinton initially
prohibited " 'illegal refugees from Cuba' " from entering the United
States and ordered their confinement at the Guantanamo Naval
Base.159 Though he allowed them entrance soon afterwards, the tide
of migration did not subside. In response, the United States closed
the "preferential open door" policy and introduced the "wet foot/dry
foot" policy, which allowed those Cubans who reached land to avail
154. Robin C. Williams, In the Shadow of Plenty, Cuba Copes with a Crippled Health
Care System, in CUBA READER, supra note 118, at 281, 282.
155. See MIGUEL A. DE LA TORRE, LA LUCHA FOR CUBA: RELIGION AND POLITICS
ON THE STREETS OF MIAMI 73 (2003).
156. Mimi Whitefield & Mary Beth Sheridan, Cuba Poll, The Findings, in CUBA
READER, supra note 118, at 101, 101 (describing the results of the Miami Herald poll).
157. See JUAN GONZALES, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN
AMERICA 108 (2004) (describing a flotilla of makeshift boats and rafts that left Cuba in
the summer of 1994); DAVID GREGORY GUTiERREZ, THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF
LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960, at 167 (2004) (attributing the increasing
numbers of Cubans who left in rafts and small boats to worsening economic conditions
precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet Union).
158. YOLANDA PRIETO, THE CUBANS OF UNION CITY: IMMIGRANTS AND EXILES IN
A NEW JERSEY COMMUNITY 13 (2009) (noting that the balseros were also caught up in
race and anti-immigration issues).
159. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1
(1996) (quoting President Clinton), available at http://www.fas.orglmanlcrs/94-005.htm;
Brenner et al., supra note 141, at 192, 194.
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themselves of the privileges of the Cuban Adjustment Act but
required the Cubans intercepted at sea to return to Cuba."6 These
arrangements were based on new migration accords in 1994 and 1995
designed to further stem the tide of rafters. 6'
The policy of encouraging migration to the United States as a
means to weaken Cuba had failed and was no longer considered an
effective means to remove the Cuban government. United States
sanctions had indeed contributed to weakening Cuba's economy. But
as historian Louis A. Nrez, Jr., observed, "[t]he concept of sanctions
... was deeply flawed" since pressures created by sanctions "were in
large part relieved by Cuban emigration."162 Because Cuban families
in the United States overwhelmingly desired to visit and support their
families in Cuba, a flow of foreign exchange and goods allowed many
Cubans to survive the very sanctions designed to topple the Cuban
government. 63 As a result, U.S. policy began to increase its focus on
restricting travel and remittances.
B. Shifting Strategies: Deterring Family Support
Cuban 9migrgs had been afforded privileges in the realm of entry
into the United States. They gained admission according to laws that
were exclusively created for and applied to Cubans. 6 They benefited
from social services designed for Cubans only and achieved political
enfranchisement with relative ease. 165 But these privileges were
conceived in service of U.S. foreign policy-not as a matter of family
sustenance-and could not be parlayed into the circumstances of the
everyday practices of maintaining binational family relationships.
With some brief exceptions, families who wished to travel to
Cuba and send funds to relatives on the island have always suffered
160. Guillermo J. Grenier, The Creation and Maintenance of the Cuban American
"Exile Ideology": Evidence from the FlU Cuba Poll 2004, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST.,
Winter/Spring 2007, at 209, 212-13; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 98, at 49-50 (detailing
the criticism of the policy).
161. See SULLIVAN, supra note 98, at 49. Per the 1994 migration accords, the United
States agreed to accept 20,000 Cubans, not including immediate relatives, and agreed to
discontinue the policy of granting parole to all Cubans who reached land. Id. Cuba agreed
to take measures to stop unsafe departures from Cuba. Id. Pursuant to a second accord in
1995, the United States paroled in some 30,000 Cubans in Guantanamo but thereafter
would intercept and return them to Cuba. Id. Cuba agreed to provide information about
legal immigration processes and agreed that it would take no adverse action against those
who attempted the trip. Id.
162. Pdrez, supra note 48, at 249.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 74-77 and 115 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 77 and 116 and accompanying text.
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the punishment of the U.S. economic war on Cuba.'6 6 Since 1959, U.S.
laws and regulations affecting families have operated in a dialectical
warp that has corresponded to weaknesses that continually burden
the Cuban state, as well as global economic conditions, affronts, and
perceived wrongs committed by the Cuban government. The pattern
of restrictions alternating with relaxation of the rules by which
Cuban-Americans must abide in order to support their families
continues to the present, with little sign of normalization of relations.
Although the initial embargo and Treasury Department
regulations did not specifically ban travel or remittances, the
restrictions on financial transactions with Cuba ultimately did.'67 In
1977, Cuban families benefited from a brief exception to the
restrictions when the Carter administration permitted travel-related
transactions under a general license for anyone wishing to travel to
Cuba.'68 The Carter administration authorized limited remittances in
1978.169 In 1982, the Reagan administration reinstated travel
restrictions but continued to allow general licenses for families
visiting close relatives. 7 ' Then, in 1988, the Reagan administration
imposed new hardships on families wishing to travel or send
remittances by creating a new licensing system for travel services and
remittance forwarding businesses engaged in Cuba-related
transactions. 171 These changes were made to discourage such
businesses in order to "reduce the flow of hard currency to Cuba
through transactions with persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.',
172
During the 1990s, global circumstances demonstrated the
importance of travel and remittances.173 Cuba undertook significant
166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
167. MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON
TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL31139.pdf.
168. Id. at 2-3.
169. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 1336, 1336 (Jan. 9, 1978)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.561 (2009)) (permitting a maximum of $500 in any
three month period and a one time remittance of $500 for the purposes of facilitating
immigration to the United States to "close relatives" defined as a "spouse, child,
grandchild, parent, grandparent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, nephew, niece, or spouse, and
widows or widowers of the foregoing").
170. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,526, 47,527 (Nov. 23, 1988)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2009)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Enrique V. Iglesias, Foreword to BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: MAKING
MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT, at ix, ix-x (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds.,
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reforms to increase the flow of funds to families and endeavored to
improve relations with jmigres.74 In this period, the characteristics of
Cuban migration resembled the migration patterns and consequences
elsewhere in Latin America; the economies of which were based on a
growing dependency on family remittances as an important source of
national income.'75 Remittances from abroad, particularly from the
Unites States, dramatically increased. 7 6 It was at this point that U.S.
laws became increasingly punitive.
In addition to the provisions of the Torricelli Act that sought to
halt all trade with Cuba, the Act authorized the President to impose
restrictions on remittances to Cuba and thus limit the amount that
could be spent on Cuban families wishing to travel to the United
States to visit family.'77 In 1992, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") reduced the sum that families could send from $500 to
$300 in any one quarter.'78 The Act authorized the Treasury
Department to take enforcement action against families who violated
the 1992 restrictions.1 79 In an effort to avoid the more rigorous
standards of proof necessary to proceed in criminal matters, OFAC
amended its rules to enact civil penalties of up to fifty thousand
dollars. 80
From 1994 through 1998, the Clinton administration prohibited
family remittances except "when extreme hardship is demonstrated in
2005) (relating the increased movement of people who leave their homes to obtain jobs
and remit funds back to their families as a feature of the circumstances of globalization).
174. Barberia, supra note 95, at 10-13, 24 (noting the legalization of the dollar, banking
reforms, augmenting consumer spending and investment options in the economy, and the
establishment of a special office dedicated to migrgs relations).
175. Manuel Orozco, Globalization and Migration: The Impact of Family Remittances
in Latin America, LATIN AM. POL. & SOC., Summer 2002, at 41, 46. Remittances also
serve an additional purpose of demonstrating broader global economic relations-an
important consideration for Cuba. See id. at 62. In recent years, Cubans have migrated to
Canada, Spain, Germany, Pakistan, Venezuela, and Kuwait from where they have been
sending remittances. Joel Millman, Cuba Receives More Cash from Workers Abroad,
WALL ST. J., Mar 5, 2009, at A12.
176. Barberia, supra note 95, at 25.
177. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1706, 106 Stat. 2575, 2579
(1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6005(c) (2006)).
178. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,847, 49,847 (Oct. 2, 1991)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2009)).
179. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, § 1710, 106 Stat. at 2580 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 6009(a), (e) (2006)).
180. See Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings and Markup
Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 388, 398 (1992) (statement of R.
Richard Newcomb, Director OFAC, Dep't. of the Treasury).
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cases involving extreme humanitarian need."'' Cuban Americans
were no longer permitted to travel under a general license to family;
instead, they were required to submit to a case-by-case review for
permission to engage in "travel-related transactions., 18 2 Both travel
and remittance rules were liberalized again in 1995, then tightened in
1996 as a consequence of the Helms-Burton Act,'183 and relaxed again
in 1998.1 However, in 1998, new regulations obliged Cuban
Americans to sign a remittance affidavit that included data on
households of both sender and recipient, a requirement that
discouraged individuals from sending money through officially
sanctioned channels. 85
Between 2000 and 2004, the Bush administration again eased and
tightened the regulations. In 2003, a notable regulatory amendment
allowed visits of relatives within three degrees of relationship without
having to demonstrate humanitarian need. 86 These amendments also
increased the amount of money that could be carried to Cuba from
$300 to $3,000, although the limit of $300 per quarter destined for
each household did not change. 87 At the same time, OFAC
enforcement capabilities were once more strengthened, and President
Bush directed the Department of Homeland Security to increase
enforcement efforts related to travel and any item sent to Cuba.1 88
The ongoing changes and ever-tightening restrictions affecting
migration, travel, and remittances raise persistent concerns about the
nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The policy has relied primarily on
181. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,884, 44,885 (Aug. 30, 1994)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2009)). CANF insisted that President Clinton
stop remittances altogether, and the President agreed. Barberia, supra note 95, at 29.
182. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. at 44,885.
183. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, § 112, 110 Stat. 785, 802 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6042 (2006)).
184. Id.; SULLIVAN, supra note 129, at 3-4.
185. Barberia, supra note 95, at 30 (noting that OFAC licensing requirements served to
deter remittances).
186. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,141, 14,147 (Mar. 24, 2003)
(codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.561 (2009)).
187. 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,146 (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(c)(4)(i)
(2009)).
188. SULLIVAN, supra note 167, at 13-14. Ironically, in 2004, the same year that Cuban-
American families suffered the most severe Bush administration prohibitions, a report on
the Treasury Department's allocation of resources disclosed that only four employees
were investigating Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein's money, while twenty-four
agents were working on the Cuba embargo. See John Solomon, More Agents Track Castro
than Bin Laden, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 2004, http://www.globalexchange.org/
countries/americas/cuba/1803.html (noting that the Treasury had 93 enforcement




statutory and regulatory schemes to deny Cuban families the ability
to discharge fundamental commitments to loved ones.189 Although as
Adam Feibelman points out, remittances may "act as incentives for
workers to migrate internationally, in some cases increasing their
exposure to unfair business practices and imposing costs on family
members who remain in the workers' home countries;" 190 in the case
of Cuba, it is more complicated. The migration context of Cuban
remittances is entwined with the economic turmoil caused by the
embargo. On one side of the Florida Straits, the Cuban government
readily encouraged remittances in an attempt to redress the effects of
an economic war and a global capitalist economy.1 91 On the other
side, for most of the past fifty years, U.S. laws have restricted Cuban
Americans from sending remittances."9 Despite the refusal of the
United States to depoliticize the practices of family sustenance,
Cuban Americans have continued to find ways to meet their
obligations to family notwithstanding obstacles posed by U.S. law. 93
C. A Failed Policy: The Binational Family as Transgressor
While restrictions on remittances and travel have been a nearly
constant feature of U.S. foreign policy, so too has the willingness of
Cuban-American families to violate the law. Whether funds are sent
to assist family members to migrate or to help with everyday
necessities in Cuba, remittances have flowed continuously since
Cubans first migrated to the United States.'94 Families have traveled
illegally, typically through third countries. 95 They have also sought to
bring their loved ones to the island through unauthorized and
sometimes dangerous means.
96
189. Remittance restrictions are not applicable to any other Latin American
immigrant. See Susan Eckstein, Diasporas and Dollars: Transnational Ties and the
Transformation of Cuba 16 (Inter-University Comm. on Int'l Migration, Working Paper
No. 16, 2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/migration/pubs/rrwp/16
diasporas.pdf.
190. North Carolina Law Review, Symposium Schedule, http://nclawreview.net/
symposium/syposium-details/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); see Adam Feibelman, The Very
Uneasy Case Against Remittances: An Ex Ante Perspective, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1786
(2010).
191. Eckstein, supra note 189, at 12.
192. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 98, at 27.
193. See infra Part III.C.
194. See Barberia, supra note 95, at 26.
195. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 98, at 28 (noting that the U.S. government cracked
down on religious organizations that facilitated unauthorized trips to Cuba).
196. Lissa Weinmann, Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy, WORLD POL'Y J., Spring
2004, at 22, 26. See generally Matias Rojas Bruce, Cuba's Open Boats, AM. SPECTATOR,
Sep. 1991, at 12 (describing desperate relatives who hire boats to aid families to migrate).
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The determinants of transgressive behaviors are varied and
complex. They include historic, political, and cultural forces, some
unique to Cuba, others related to globalization factors, and still others
that are characteristic of families generally. The history of Cuban
immigration to the United States dates back to the nineteenth century
and includes a sustained pattern of immigrants providing support to
relatives on the island."9  Notwithstanding the disruption to
households occasioned by the constancy of migration flows, experts
who have studied the sociology of the Cuban family have described
families as "the most important social unit in the life of Cubans."'98
"Familism" is the basic structure of Cuban society and includes not
only nuclear and extended family, but friends, neighbors, and
communities who represent fictive kin. 9 9 The strength of these
relationships overrides laws that limit the ability of families to sustain
relationships.
Professor Guillermo Bernal, who has studied Cuban migration,
notes that "the degree of connectedness that Cuban families maintain
to their birthplace, culture, and roots is an important element in the
assessment of the Cuban families in the United States ... [l]oyalty
and legacy issues are particularly visible with Cuban families."2 '
Cubans have successfully established a society in accordance with
historic ideals of self-sacrifice, collective duty, and civic participation
and have cultivated a consciousness of being Cuban ("conciencia").2 1
As one Cuban scholar has noted, "nationalism constitutes a force for
unifying people that is superior to any ideological or philosophical
creed."'20
Scholars who have studied patterns of remittance have observed
that Cuban Americans are less likely than other remittors to be
197. See Poyo, supra note 1, at 45-48 (describing the forces of Cuban nationalism in the
exile community that led to the raising of funds to support leaders on the island).
198. Bernal, supra note 50, at 140; see also Lisandro P6rez, The Household Structure of
Second-Generation Children: An Exploratory Study of Extended Family Arrangements, 28
INT'L. MIGRATION REV. 736, 741 (1994) (describing how Cuban families in the United
States often consist of three generations, a structure that is consistent with traditional,
Cuban values).
199. Bernal, supra note 50, at 140; see also LEMKAU & STRUG, supra note 23, at 2-3
(noting the tendency of Cuban families to maintain close ties and extended family and
community relationships).
200. Bernal, supra note 50, at 151.
201. Deborah M. Weissman & Marsha Weissman, The Moral Politics of Social Control:
Political Culture and Ordinary Crime in Cuba, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming Apr.
2010).
202. Rafael Hernindez, "Conflict Resolution" Between the United States and Cuba:
Clarifications, Premises and Precautions, in CUBA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, supra
note 134, at 177, 179.
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motivated for self-interested purposes and more apt to send money to
families primarily out of altruistic motives.2 °3 Unlike other remittors
who send funds back to the home country where they may have some
expectations of return, Cuban 9migr~s generally consider themselves
to be in the United States permanently. 2° They have no assumptions
of personally benefitting from funds sent to the island.2 5 Moreover,
they cannot expect their funds to be privately invested or yield profits
given the nature of the Cuban political economy.0 6
It is these characteristics that provide the context for considering
the variety of ways that Cubans confront the restrictions. Some are
legal but many are illegal. Cuban Americans formed the Cuban-
American Commission for Family Rights to counter the travel and
remittance restrictions. 207 In 2004, as opinions moderated in the exile
community, CANF reversed its support of travel restrictions and
denounced the Bush administration restrictions.2 8 More recently,
CANF released a "White Paper" for the purposes of addressing U.S.-
Cuba relations and encouraging the U.S. government to lift
restrictions on all family travel and remittances.2 9 Other groups have
attempted to bring political pressure in an effort to lift the
restrictions.210
203. Blue, supra note 26, at 64 (concluding that, given the social and structural factors
that influence remittances, Cuban Americans remit for altruistic purposes as opposed to
self-interest); see Jorgen Carling, The Determinants of Migration Remittances, 24 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 581, 583 (2008) (reviewing the economic literature on migrant
remittances and the motivational models as determinants for sending remittances).
204. Portes, supra note 50, at 4.
205. Cf Barberia, supra note 95, at 30-31 (noting that despite the fact that remittance
restrictions were lessened, many Cuban Americans were deterred from sending them
because of attitudes that doing so was treasonous).
206. See Eckstein, supra note 189, at 26.
207. Philip Brenner & Marguerite Jimenez, U.S. Policy on Cuba: Beyond the Last
Gasp, N. AM. CONGRESS ON LATIN AM., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 15, 19.
208. Id. (" 'It divides our base .... It's not in [President Bush's] political best interest
to divide a community whose support for President Bush makes Crawford, Texas, look
like enemy territory.' " (quoting the former CANF head and then-board member)).
209. THE CUBAN AM. NAT'L FOUND., A NEW COURSE FOR U.S.-CUBA POLICY:
ADVANCING PEOPLE-DRIVEN CHANGE 7, 10-11 (2009), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/national/20090409cubaCANF-paper.pdf
210. See Families Torn Apart: Human Rights and U.S. Restrictions on Cuban-American
Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 22-58 (2008) (statements of
Hector Palacios, Cuban pro-democracy activist; Marlene Arzola, Cuban American with
family in Cuba; Blanca Gonzalez, mother of a political prisoner; Luisa Montero-Diaz,
Cuban American with family in Cuba; Ignacio Sosa, Board Member, Cuba Study Group;
Sylvia Iriondo, President, Mothers Against Repression; Ninoksa P6rez, Board Member,
Cuban Liberty Council; Francisco J. Herndndez, President, Cuban-American Nat'l
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However, many Cubans denied legal means to visit family have
opted for extralegal means.211 Families have resorted to obtaining
licenses to travel on false pretenses, signing up with religious
organizations as religious workers without any intentions of carrying
out religious work, or traveling illegally through third countries.2"2
Informal means of travel and remittance-sending include black
market couriers, or mulas, to carry funds and transit through third
counties.213 The Cuban-American community in Miami facilitates
networks to assist with the processes and practices of sending money
with other travelers.214 Anywhere from sixty to seventy-five percent of
remittance dollars to Cuba are transmitted through covert means.215
Between 1994 and 1998, when remittances were fully banned,
Cuba simultaneously enacted regulatory changes that liberalized the
receipt and use of remittances.216 Ironically, it was during this period
that funds from Cuban Americans to their families actually
increased.217 Cuban Americans were responding not to U.S. laws, but
rather to legal changes in Cuba that facilitated the use of dollars by
their families.21 8
Sending remittances illegally is not uncommon among Cuban
Americans. Early exiles contribute a significant portion of
remittances, despite a perception that they have few relatives in
Cuba, and are hostile to sending remittances. 219 In one recent study of
attitudes toward remittances among Cuban Americans, political
disincentives were found to have no major effect on the decision
Found.; Philip Peters, Vice President, Lexington Inst.), available at
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/44530.pdf.
211. Peter Slevin, Policy Met Politics in Cuba Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2004, at A7
("'I get very offended with someone telling me how to engage with my family .... I don't
want to go illegally, but if I need to go see my family because my uncle's not doing well or
somebody's dying, I'll figure out a way to get there.' " (quoting a Cuban American)).
212. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 52, 60; see SULLIVAN, supra note 98,
at 28 (noting that the U.S. government cracked down on religious organizations that
facilitated unauthorized trips to Cuba); Weinmann, supra note 196, at 26.
213. See Jonathan P. Decker, Smuggling Cash to Cuba Rises in Defiance of Embargo,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), May 24, 1995, at A3; Eckstein, supra note 189, at 15.
214. Decker, supra note 213, at A3 (reporting that the Cuban-American community
transmits information about who is traveling back to Cuba and when they are going).
215. Eckstein, supra note 189, at 15. Moreover, even today, only a small number of
Cubans enter the United States according to the legal procedures set forth in the
Immigration and Nationality Act. WASEM, supra note 72, at 9.
216. Barberia, supra note 95, at 25, 32 (noting Cuba's legalization of the bank accounts
and investments for 4migrgs and legalization of the dollar).
217. Id. at 31-32.
218. Blue, supra note 26, at 65 (observing that since the embargo, remittance flows
correspond to Cuban government policies and initiatives).
219. Id. at 75.
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whether or not to send funds.22° Additionally, over time, the flow of
dollars to Cuba has steadily increased, even after migrants assimilate
in the United States.221 Cuban Americans who visit their homeland
are additionally motivated to send money.22 For most Cuban
Americans, humanitarian concerns for family override political
issues.223
Although it is difficult to measure remittances to Cuba because
of the informal corridors through which funds are transmitted, the
existing data on the volume of funds remitted corroborates the
resolve with which Cuban Americans support their families.
Notwithstanding the remittance restrictions, from the early 1990s
until 2004, dollars were the principal currency in Cuba as a result of
funds sent by Cuban Americans. 4 Even as remittances have declined
elsewhere as a result of the recent global economic crisis, the amount
of remittances to Cuba has increased.225 In short, the restrictions do
not reduce the transmission of funds; rather, they only increase the
informality by which they are sent.
Although families may be successful at times in circumventing
the restrictions, they have nonetheless been devastated by their
impact. In 2005, Jeanne Parr Lemkau and David L. Strug, concerned
about the mental health effects on Cuban-American families as a
result of the 2004 restrictions, conducted in-depth surveys with
affected individuals.226  The stories they captured led one
commentator to conclude that "[s]eparating families by restricting
travel is unjust; the suffering inflicted on families, unbearable., 227 In
their report, they document an unyielding commitment expressed by
Cuban Americans for their loved ones in Cuba, a sentiment given
clear expression by one woman who stated " '[T]he family is more
powerful than any law.' ,228 Such a sentiment serves as a convincing
critique of legal mechanisms that facilitate U.S. hegemonic policies
toward Cuba.
220. Id. at 63.
221. Id. at 69, 74.
222. Id. at 76 (noting that increased visits to Cuba result in more remittances).
223. See Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (arguing
that remittances are a demonstration of love by and for transnational families and should
not be politicized).
224. Frank, supra note 145.
225. Millman, supra note 175 (noting also that Cuba has sent migrant workers abroad
beyond the United States in search of jobs).
226. See LEMKAU & STRUG, supra note 23, at vii.
227. Id. at iii.
228. Id. at 28 (quoting a Cuban American distraught about her inability to visit her
sister).
20101 1917
1918 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88
IV. OBAMA YEAR ONE: THE LIMITS OF CHANGE
On April 13, 2009, days prior to attending the Summit of the
Americas and after increasing pressure from Latin American
countries for the United States to signal a change in relations with
Cuba, President Obama announced the lifting of restrictions on
family travel and remittances. 229 The new regulations continue to
impose a limit on funds that can be used for travel (restored to the
levels in effect before the 2004 changes) and continue to require
families to complete affidavits in order to send remittances. 20 Travel
restrictions for Americans of non-Cuban descent remain in effect. 31
However, families, now redefined to once again include aunts, uncles,
cousins, and second cousins, are allowed unlimited visits. 232
Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the amount of remittances
that can be sent. 233 New regulations also make it easier for families to
send gift packages to Cuba.234
The news was, of course, welcomed not only in countless Cuban-
American households and throughout Cuba but also among a broad
range of policy makers, analysts, and international leaders long
opposed to U.S. policies toward Cuba.235 Travel agencies were
immediately flooded with reservation requests.236 On the same day of
229. Memorandum on Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba, DAILY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 200900257 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900257.pdf; Ian Swanson, Obama to Lift Some Restrictions on
Cuba, HILL, Apr. 10, 2009, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/19161-obama-to-lift-some-
restrictions-on-cuba.
230. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, supra note 9; Barberia, supra note 95, at 30,
33.
231. SULLIVAN, supra note 167, at 9-11 (itemizing ongoing travel restrictions).
232. Id. at 9.
233. Id. at 12.
234. Cuba: Revisions to Gift Parcel and Baggage Restrictions, 74 Fed. Reg. 45,985,
45,986 (Sept. 8, 2009) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 736, 740, 746).
235. Laura Meckler, U.S. to Lift Some Curbs on Travel to Cuba, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,
2009, at Al; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Declares U.S. Will Pursue
Thaw with Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at Al; Obama Eases Some Cuba Sanctions,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/politics/
bulletin/bulletin_090414.htm.
236. See Damien Cave, Charter Companies Flying to Cuba Thrive Despite Complaints,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at A16 (noting the rise in reservations to go to Cuba in light of
the more lenient White House policy on travel to Cuba); Damien Cave, Cuban-Americans
Are Ready for New Era in Relations, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, at A12 (noting
that a significant majority of Cuban Americans now support the removal of all restrictions
for travel to Cuba, including "historic exiles"); Alfonso Chardy & Rui Ferreira, South
Florida Sees Upswing in Family Trips to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8, 2009,
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/cuba/story/1224032.html (noting thousands of
travelers in the Miami airport months after Congress loosened the restrictions on family
visits to Cuba); Alan Gomez & David Jackson, Limits Lifted; Cuban Americans Make
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the President's announcement, remittance-sending providers issued
their own media statements to report that they were ready for a new
surge in business.237
But the recent modifications of U.S. regulations do not signal the
end of the paradigm within which they function. In the realm of
family travel, it merely restores the position of binational families to
the circumstances prior to the 2004 restrictions. The lifting of the
restrictions was encoded in an unchanging political jargon and
captioned as an event to "[promote] democracy and human rights in
Cuba," the euphemism of choice for toppling the Cuban
government.23 8 Although President Obama hailed his announcement
at the Summit as a "new beginning,"239 and despite the fact that his
administration acknowledged the failure of the fifty-year-old policy of
hostility toward Cuba, he made clear that the United States would not
lift the embargo. 4° Indeed, in September 2009 the President renewed
the Trading with the Enemy Act against Cuba, stating that it was in
the interest of the United States to do so-an act overwhelmingly
condemned by the international community. 2at  The Obama
administration has continued to impose significant fines for embargo
violations and has continued the ban on the exportation of medical
Travel Plans, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-04-
13-obama-cubaN.htm (predicting many reservations to Cuba).
237. See Press Release, Western Union, Western Union Prepared to Meet Consumer
Demand and Expand Money Transfer Services from U.S. to Cuba (Apr. 13, 2009),
http://ir.westernunion.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=376921.
238. Memorandum on Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Cuba, DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 200900257 (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900257.pdf; see Louis A. P6rez, Jr., Welcome Change in U.S.-
Cuba Policy, but Not Far Enough, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 30, 2009,
http://www.progressive.org/mpperez043009.html.
239. Remarks to the Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago,
DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 200900269 (Apr. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Summit-of-
the-Americas-Opening-Ceremony/.
240. See id.; Mark Landler, Clinton Impresses Foreign Audiences by Saying U.S.
Policies Have Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at A4; Stolberg & Barrionuevo, supra
note 235.
241. See Sophia Weeks, The President's Words Versus His Performance: One More
Prong of His Presidency Shifting Towards the Democratic Centrist Wing of the Party
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.coha.org/the-president-words-versus-his-performance-one-
more-prong-of-his-presidency-shifting-towards-the-democratic-centrist-wing-of-the-party/;
see also Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Embargo on CubaAgain Finds Scant Support at U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009, at A8 (reporting that the most recent vote of 187 in support, 3
opposed, and 2 abstaining, indicated a total lack of support for U.S. efforts to isolate
Cuba).
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equipment. 42 Moreover, the Obama administration decided to
continue to keep Cuba on the list of terrorist states. 43
As historian Louis P6rez has observed, "Obama's 'new
beginning' possesses a wearisome familiarity., 244 Since the Clinton
administration, U.S. officials have noted a readiness to change policy
toward Cuba, and a willingness to respond albeit " 'in a carefully
calibrated way' " to Cuban economic and political reforms. 45 But
reforms in Cuba, when they are made, have been used in the United
States as evidence of Cuban weakness, followed by U.S. demands for
more reforms. Carlos Gutierrez, outgoing Commerce Secretary under
the Bush administration, counseled then-President-elect Obama
about the need to be cautious with regard to policy toward Cuba,
describing it as " 'something between a game of chicken and a game
of chess.' ",246 Given President Obama's continuation of failed
policies, one would assume that he has followed Gutierrez's advice
and that binational family relations still remain subject to foreign
policy manipulation.
CONCLUSION
There are good reasons to seek meaningful changes toward
Cuba. What is required is no less than the normalization of
relationships to foster dialogue, debate, and engagement in the
pursuit of solutions to the various concerns of mutual interests to
both Cuba and the United States. In a recent report issued by the
Center for Democracy in the Americas, Cuba analysts from a broad
range of disciplines have offered various proposals for shifting from a
failed Cuba policy.2 47 In addition to lifting all restrictions on trade and
travel, the report's authors have endorsed "cooperation in military
affairs and law enforcement, health research and hurricane
preparedness, energy development and migration policy, commerce
and academic exchange, and for reuniting Cuban families-to build
242. MacFarquhar, supra note 241.
243. Weeks, supra note 241.
244. P6rez, supra note 238.
245. Petras & Morley, supra note 133, at 274 (quoting Secretary of State Warren
Christopher).
246. Steve LeVine, The U.S. and Cuba: A Thaw in Rhetoric, Not Trade, BUS. WK., Apr.
20, 2009, http://www.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dnflash/content/apr2009/db20090419
125338.htm (quoting Carlos Gutierrez).
247. See generally CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE AMS., 9 WAYS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO
CUBA & FOR CUBA TO TALK TO U.S. (Sarah Stephens & Alice Dunscomb eds., 2009),
available at http://democracyinamericas.org/cubacentrallblog-post/new-report-9-ways-us-
talk-cuba-and-cuba-talk-us (combining several experts' views on how to find solutions to
mutual problems shared by the United States and Cuba).
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trust back into the U.S.-Cuba relationship., 24 8 Colonel Lawrence
Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell,
noted the importance of Cuba to U.S. relationships in the Western
Hemisphere. "By [acting positively toward Cuba] ... we open the
door to our backyard, our hemisphere, to Canada, to Mexico, to all of
Central and South America. We open the door in a way we have
never done before. ' 249 Certainly Cuba's close relationship with
Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution, described as a
"movement" that "has galvanised people, first across Venezuela and
then across South America as a whole," demonstrates Cuba's
hemispheric importance.25 ° Cuba has played a significant role in the
formation of Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas Agreement
("ALBA"), which has given rise to a financial institution ("Banco del
Sur") designed to provide alternatives to the World Bank and the
development of alternative structures to neoliberalism.2 1' Recently,
old Cold War rhetoric has re-emerged as former high-ranking
officials have proclaimed post-coup Honduras "as the principal
battleground in a proxy fight with Cuba and Venezuela., 25 2 These
actions challenge the paradigm of U.S. hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere. Until the United States ceases to see itself as " 'the
centre of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the
rest of the world,' " a change of policy is unlikely. 3
United States laws that have facilitated these policies violate the
very normative functions of law by their failure to operate as a
248. Sarah Stephens, Preface to 9 WAYS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO CUBA & FOR CUBA TO
TALK TO U.S., supra note 247, at 8.
249. Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, Remarks at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill Conference on the United States and Cuba: Rethinking Engagement (Sept.
26, 2008), available at http://isa.unc.edu/Wilkerson-Cuba%20Speech%20at%20UNC
%20Chapel%2OHill,%2OSept%20%2708.pdf (noting U.S.-Cuba relations as having
singular importance for U.S.-Latin American relations).
250. See Mohsen al Attar & Rosalie Miller, TWAIL Revisited-The Bolivarian
Reconstruction of International Law 8 (July 22, 2009) (SSRN, Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1437362 (identifying the progressive, if
not revolutionary candidates who have won elections in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, and Nicaragua).
251. Id. at 1, 9, 10, 13 (describing, for example, Cuba's efforts to rescue Bolivia's
soybean crop and its role in thwarting U.S. efforts to establish the Free Trade Area of the
Americas).
252. Ginger Thompson & Ron Nixon, Leader Ousted, Honduras Hires U.S. Lobbyists,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, at Al (identifying former officials who have characterized the
efforts to restore Manuel Zelaya, President of Honduras ousted after a coup, by using
rationale and language approximating Cold War rhetoric).
253. Pankaj Mishra, Rise of the Rest, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Nov. 6, 2008, at 13, 15
(quoting George Kennan, author of the "Long Telegram" that became the basis of the
Truman Doctrine).
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"'body of general principles, not a collection of special
commands.' "254 Using the law in this way is ironic, given U.S.
demands of the Cuban government for change that include greater
democratic freedoms for Cuban people and to respect basic human
rights.255 United States restrictions on family travel violate principles
of family reunification that have served as the cornerstone of
immigration law, as well as a number of human rights laws that
guarantee the right to leave and return to one's country.256 The
prohibitions on remittances have served to interfere with the personal
bonds, emotional ties, and basic family rights that such transactions
represent.257 The irony has not been lost on Cuban Americans who
have suffered the restrictions and whose grief and anger are
expressed by one woman who stated, " 'Some day it will seem
preposterous to anyone that the U.S. government ever devised such
restrictions.' ,258 It would seem that day is long overdue.
For now, the restrictions that most directly burden the Cuban
binational family have been lifted. But the Trading with the Enemy
Act, the Torricelli Act, and the Helms-Burton Act, which have
functioned as a personal embargo against families who have borne
the brunt of U.S. policies, remain in place. Binational families
continue to suffer the consequences of these laws. The hope lies in
the very words expressed by President Obama on the eve of the
lifting of restrictions-that "the Cuban people's desire to freely
determine their future and that of their country is in the national
interest of the United States., 259 Only time will tell if those words will
be given meaning and whether fifty years of a loathsome policy can
be reversed.
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